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Abstract  
 The purpose of this paper is to analyze salient political risks common 
in Latin America identifying the contexts in which they take place and the 
reasons for their recurrence, insofar as they affect international business 
investors in this region. Through a comparison of past and present political 
patterns in Latin America, this study assesses political risk traps, or 
combinations of repeatedly unforeseen political risks that international 
businesses may encounter in Latin American countries. The article identifies 
eight critical questions that investors must address looking at political risks 
in Latin America, as political situations faced by Latin American countries 
tend to be similar throughout time. It also shows the combination of political 
risks factors leading to a particular political risk configuration in the region. 
Political risks in Latin America appear over and over again because of 
enduring, vested interests of entrenched power groups in Latin America. 
Current techniques and methods to forecast country political risk are 
insufficient for international investors to grasp the full range of risks they 
may confront while investing in Latin America. Previous literature has not 
analyzed political risk combination and recurrence in an integrative 
approach. Therefore, the originality of our article is to present a framework 
of political risks, with a specific application to Latin America, highlighting 
the specific reasons for their recurrence there. 
 
Keywords: Emerging markets; Political risk; Country risk analysis; Latin 
America 
 
Introduction: 
 Emerging Markets (EMs) remain a driving force behind current 
growth and expansion in today’s globalized business world (Khanna & 
Palepu, 2013; Ernst, Kahle, Dubiel, Prabhu, & Subramaniam, 2015). 
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Companies from around the globe continue to enter into these dynamic 
markets, either eagerly or reluctantly. Whichever the case, they are spurred 
by waning home markets and escalating competitive pressure. Strong EMs 
presence in world market portfolios is no longer an option; it is crucial to a 
healthy and enduring bottom line. However, EMs also represent a source of 
added volatility for firms. 
To mitigate risks, firms tend to adopt a cautious process whereby 
they limit risk exposure through a gradual entry process.  Firms may take an 
active role, assume a high level of risk and adopt long-term commitments 
through alternative modes of entry such as joint ventures, greenfield 
investments or acquisition (Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik & Peng, 2009). Before 
entry decisions are made, common sense demands country political risk 
analysis (CPRA) to be conducted; to identify and assess potential hazards 
such as expropriation or difficulties to repatriate profits for example.   
Numerous CPRA approaches, guidelines, websites and services are 
readily available (Howell, 1998; Bouchet, Clark & Groslambert, 2003; 
McKellar, 2010).  However, most approaches remain generic and do not 
sufficiently consider factors derived from specific and complex EMs 
contexts, particularly in Latin America.  They do not study sufficiently 
possible factor combinations, limiting the range of the analysis. Despite the 
blossoming opportunities that Latin American markets offer to multinational 
corporations (MNCs) and global investors, political risks continue to be a 
major hindrance to the benefits of entry and permanence in this region. 
Some studies analyze specific risk scenarios in the Latin American 
region, such as the nationalization of the pension system in Argentina and of 
the oil industry in Venezuela, the presence of organized crime in Central 
America or the Venezuelan commercial blockade against Colombian imports 
(Rarick, 2000; Eljuri & Treviño, 2010; De Villa & Rajwani, 2013). 
However, there is a lack of integration regarding the most common political 
risks, the context in which they take place and the combinations of risk 
factors at the regional level. Furthermore, literature has not addressed the 
reasons accounting for the recurrence of such risks in Latin American 
countries. Identifying the risk situations or traps that are prone to recurrence 
matters because this knowledge could improve the degree of predictability in 
the analysis of political risks that directly affect international businesses.  
It is noteworthy that the contexts surrounding these risk traps, or 
situations which are repeatedly unforeseen; regardless of the host 
government, include stakeholders such as terrorist groups, activist groups, 
drug cartels, political opponents, rebel groups and members of local 
communities. Consequently, the presence of one kind of risk in a specific 
country of this region is normally attached to the existence of other types of 
risks. Hence, the importance of analyzing and evaluating the factors involved 
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in a political risk situation as a whole. This multi-factor risk-analysis 
approach enhances the assessment of the current political and economic 
situation of Latin American EMs; so necessary for MNCs expansion 
decisions. 
Thus, we propose that there are significant commonalities in Latin 
America regarding CPRA, in spite of the heterogeneity of the countries 
composing the region in terms of institutional structures, political 
orientations, population sizes, kinds of industries and overall economic 
development. The two research questions in our article are: is there a 
combination of political risk factors common to Latin America? How can we 
account for the recurrence of the combination of such risk factors in the 
region? 
The analysis of Latin America from a risk perspective is both relevant 
and timely. On the one hand, most of the countries of this region are 
commodity-dependent economies which tend to have higher levels of 
political risk (Jensen & Johnston, 2011) due to the fact that in these 
economies once the resources have been discovered there is little incentive to 
build the necessary institutional capacity to manage resource rents' (Askari, 
Rehman & Arfaa, 2010: 61). Such issues are also relevant as they are 
envisaged within a historical context marked by political shifts between neo-
liberal policies and neo-populist pressures (Knight, 1998; Weyland, 2004). 
The organization of this paper is as follows. First, in the theoretical 
section, we summarize literature on political risk identification and 
assessment. We then present a synthesis of the most frequent indicators of 
political risk that we identified from news events and literature reviews, to 
establish our own list of what we refer to as [risk traps] or situations in which 
companies are caught unawares. The next section illustrates such risk traps 
through six selected country cases in which we compare the current state of 
politics with major events of the past. We then discuss the main findings of 
our risk analysis in Latin America. Finally, we conclude with a summary of 
the key findings, further research directions and the main limitations of our 
work.   
 
Literature review 
 Political risk is one of the most important challenges for MNCs, 
especially when they expand their business into developing nations. It is one 
of the major constraints on foreign investors who seek to expand into foreign 
markets (Baek & Qian, 2011).  As Sepúlveda and Bonilla state (2011), in 
order to have a global view of the factors that may affect the decision to start 
or continue a business venture, it is necessary to analyze the specific 
characteristics of some countries having a high level of political risk. It is 
important to mention that political risks do not always stem from 
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governments but may be also initiated by nongovernment forces such as war, 
terrorism, revolution, to name a few (Rarick, 2000). 
 
Overview of Methods for Assessing Political Risk  
 Haendel (1979) refers to political risk as the probability of occurrence 
of some political event(s) that will change the prospects for the profitability 
of a given investment. Howell and Chaddick (1994: 71) define political risk 
as ‘the possibility that political decisions, events or conditions in a country, 
including those that might be referred to as social, will affect the business 
environment such that investors will lose money or have a reduced profit 
margin’. As argued by Kobrin (1979), political risk deals with the probability 
that a sovereign state will be unwilling or unable to guarantee a favorable 
business and investment environment as a result of state-pursued policies or 
due to events outside its control. Moreover, Álvarez and Urbano (2011) 
suggest that political stability has a positive relationship with private 
investment, entrepreneurial activity, and economic growth. 
CPR analysts need a comprehensive knowledge of national and 
international events, macroeconomics and an understanding of the historical 
and socio-political institutions in the particular country to make a thorough 
identification and assessment. 
Comprehensive political risk identification and assessment requires 
both quantitative as well as qualitative approaches. The existing literature 
describes a variety of methods for CPRA (Nath, 2004). Qualitative methods 
help to identify intangible factors that may be of prime importance. Some 
examples include: events, processes, customs, traditions, tendencies, social 
climates, grievances, political rifts, inter-country disputes, and other 
subtleties that do not fit into quantitative models. While the structured 
qualitative method uses a standardized format with specifically stipulated 
scope and focus of analysis (Nath, 2004), our assessment follows a 
qualitative method in discussing the political conditions of particular Latin 
American countries. 
Our assessment complements composite indexes which are 
comprehensive, consolidated and aggregate measures of overall risk.  They 
are made up of groups of critical factors organized using standardized 
systems whose goals are to provide useful statistical or numerical measures 
of country performance, trends over time and perceptions of what is believed 
to be in store for the future. Usually, these composite indexes encompass a 
large number of factors which are averaged (or weighted and ranked 
according to the relative importance experts believe they exert on overall risk 
and then are averaged) to arrive at final scores.  These scores permit analysts 
to compare different countries all at the same time and have the advantage of 
providing common denominators for comparison.  Composite indexes are 
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available from several different sources and provide different perspectives 
from which countries may be compared (Baek & Qian, 2011; The PRS 
Group, 2012; Deng & Pheng, 2012). 
 
Country Political Risk Approaches  
 Numerous approaches are available for identifying and assessing 
country political risk.  The following paragraphs summarize these 
approaches. Most country-political risk services use an eclectic mix of 
economic or social-political indicators based on criteria arising from 
experience and judgment (Meldrum, 2000). Deng and Pheng (2012) suggest 
that political risks can be attributed to political events, discriminatory actions 
taken (or lack of action) by the government or power groups in the host 
country, resulting in changes or discontinuities in the business environment 
and affecting negatively the operation of firms. Berlin (2004) distinguishes 
instability risks (sabotage, labor strikes, rioting and civil wars) from 
government risks (deliberate legal or illegal actions of the government). 
Factors that normally appear in the political/legal category are: type 
of political system, political stability, degree of social content/discontent, 
protectionist tendencies, unfavorable attitudes toward countries and FDI, 
nationalist tendencies and track record for expropriation/confiscation, 
international trade policies, reputation for corruption, degree of bureaucracy, 
protection of property rights, type of legal system and capacity for 
enforcement of the law.  
CPR identification and assessment may also contemplate a country’s 
capacity for payment of its external debt and its currency stability as key 
factors. Its ability to meet obligations is of paramount importance for 
stability and integration in global markets. High rates of fluctuation suggest 
high economic risk, price instability, political issues and unfavorable 
investment climates. Both capacity for payment and currency stability are 
highly related. Indeed, the perception of all the aforementioned 
political/legal and economic risk factors also enter into the overall equation 
and influence the relative value of the country’s currency.  
Khanna, Palepu and Sinha (2005) offer insight into factors that are 
peculiar to EMs and should be assessed when formulating strategies either to 
enter the markets or avoid them entirely.  Those authors provide a 
comprehensive list of factors that they deem critical for analyzing EMs. 
Their research focuses on infrastructure and development gaps commonly 
present in EMs from around the world, divided into five major contexts: 
political and social system, openness, product markets, labor markets and 
capital markets. The type of government in place has a direct impact on the 
nature of the institutional voids and firms’ leeway in maneuvering around 
them or integrating them into their strategy. Within this five-context analysis, 
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country risks are inherently addressed. 
As far as Latin America is concerned, several studies have examined 
specific political risks in this region as we present in Table 1. 
Table 1. Types of Recurrent Political Risks in Latin America 
Types of Political Risk Identified 
Recurrence in Latin 
America 
High/Medium/Low 
Author(s) 
Expropriation/ Confiscation/ 
Nationalization. High 
De la Torre and Neckar, 1988; 
Eljuri and Treviño, 2010; Baek and 
Qian, 2011; Deng and Pheng, 2012 
Swings in international policy. High 
Eljuri and Treviño, 2010; Baek and 
Qian, 2011; Aguiar et al., 2012; 
Deng and Pheng, 2012 
Disguise and manipulation of 
information. High 
De la Torre and Neckar, 1988; 
Aguiar et al., 2012; Deng and 
Pheng, 2012 
Political turmoil. High De la Torre and Neckar, 1988; Solomon and Ruiz, 2012 
Over-stepping of authority. Medium 
De la Torre and Neckar, 1988; 
Rarick, 2000; Eljuri and Treviño, 
2010; Jensen and Johnston, 2011; 
Aguiar et al., 2012 
Irreverence for sovereign 
obligations. Medium 
Eljuri and Treviño, 2010; Baek and 
Qian, 2011; Aguiar et al., 2012 
Presence of organized crime or 
terrorist groups. Medium 
Baek and Qian, 2011; Solomon and 
Ruiz, 2012 
Politically-induced exogenous 
shocks. Medium 
Eljuri and Treviño, 2010; Baek and 
Qian, 2011; Aguiar et al., 2012; 
Deng and Pheng, 2012 
Source: Authors´ own elaboration. 
 
The aforementioned approaches to CPRA represent valuable practices 
that will help firms choose the best countries for investment, formulate 
strategies adapted to the conditions of the market and to monitor changes 
which, in turn, help to protect assets. Nonetheless, the literature approaches 
CPRA by analyzing and/or comparing the situation variable by variable, of 
some scale or another, instead of studying it as a complex combination of 
factors. We propose the examination of the relationship of multiple and 
evolving variables that compose political environments and their recurrence 
from one political administration to another one. 
 
Method 
 In our approach, we compare past patterns and present political 
situations to identify common risk factors necessary to assess political risk. 
We believe that relating the current state of the economy and politics with 
major events and ideologies over the past will provide more insights into the 
risk traps businesses may encounter in the future rather than solely 
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measuring/assessing isolated indicators. We also argue that the combination 
of those factors matters for CPRA.  
The case analysis is useful for understanding and predicting political 
behavior in EMs. Thus, from the identification of the most common 
indicators of political risk from the literature, in Table 2 we derive a 
framework composed of eight critical questions that firms, considering 
continuity, investment or expansion in Latin America, need to address.   
Table 2.   Eight Questions to Help Firms Avoid Risk Traps 
 Question 
1 Historically, has the country demonstrated a reverence (or irreverence) for sovereign 
obligations? 
2 How vulnerable is the country to politically induced exogenous shocks? 
3 Historically, have there been huge swings in international policy from one presidential 
administration to another? 
4 Does the country have a history of political turmoil? 
5 Over the years, have there been incidences of expropriation/confiscation and nationalization? 
6 Have there been signs of over-stepping of authority (resembling totalitarianism) that places 
the autonomy of public entities at risk? 
7 Is there evidence of the involvement of political authorities to disguise, manipulate or hide 
key information or is there transparency? 
8 Is the presence of organized crime or terrorist groups so extensive that it hinders or prevents 
the firm’s operations? 
Source: Authors´ own elaboration. 
 
 It is not enough to entrust others, including professional risk analysis 
sources, to provide relevant information to manage risk; too many firms fall 
inadvertently into risk traps that inextricably form part of the context of Latin 
American markets. We believe that this can be prevented by looking for 
trends occurring over a span of time; from the pre-globalization of the 1980s 
to the present. The eight critical questions we propose are designed to help 
firms identify key trends that have an impact on risk.  
 These questions (Table 2) are related to recurrent political risks 
(Table 1) we believe may help firms anticipate, maneuver around and/or 
create contingency scenarios to overcome adversities. Risks derived from 
these situations, we observe, are pervasive in Latin America and combined 
make this socio-economic zone distinctive from the rest of the world.  
 
Case Findings: 
Illustration of risk traps 
 We provide illustrations for the aforementioned questions in the form 
of select cases which reflect situations occurring under analogous populist 
social structures. Given this common bedrock, we refer to political risks 
which are recurrent and that, in one way or another, ultimately affect the 
operations of MNCs established in those countries. We present typical 
examples for specific countries which may be generalized to many Latin 
European Scientific Journal February 2016 edition vol.12, No.5  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
212 
American countries. Most portray two or more types of political risk. 
Argentina 
 The economic and financial history of Argentina is well known for 
provoking almost all type of crises: exchange rate, banking, debt, inflation, 
political, social and institutional crises. The most severe crisis Argentina has 
faced in recent years is undoubtedly that of 2001-2002; mainly characterized 
by the loss of financial deposits. It was a period in which mistrust ruled, 
currency restrictions were imposed, and in which most pesos slipping out of 
the financial system sought safe haven in the USD. Financial institutions, in 
particular, suffered extraordinary losses and the value of the shares of 
publicly traded banks plunged.  The legacy of ten quarters of recession that 
began in 1998 (contagion from the Brazilian economic crisis), a record fiscal 
deficit and the deteriorating conditions of access to credit markets were 
triggers of the crisis.  An inflexible currency peg combined with central bank 
mismanagement exacerbated the crisis. By the end of 2001, Argentina's 
country risk reached a record: 9.588 points (Dabós, Secco & Olaiz, 2007). 
Social chaos and the collapse of the economic system threatened the survival 
of both domestic and international businesses.   
In the midst of the crisis, Argentina defaulted on USD $100 billion 
debt (Reuters, 2011a).  One direct consequence of these events was 
Argentina’s inability/unwillingness to honor its sovereign debts; precisely the 
first risk trap we consider as part of our questions.  Still, Argentina is largely 
cut off from access to the global credit markets (The Economist, 2013a).   
Argentina illustrates a second kind of risk trap: swings in 
international policy. Approximately a decade ago, the country instigated a 
series of privatizations. Former president, Néstor Kirchner, late husband of 
former president Cristina Fernández, championed this process. Ironically, in 
2012 former president Fernández executed one of the most controversial of 
all of Argentina’s expropriations with the Spanish oil firm, Repsol. Former 
president Fernández defended her posture with arguments hinging on the 
“overly dominant” position of the firm in the local fuel market, a pending tax 
debt, absence of a solid plan to raise production, lack of domestic 
reinvestment and development, and a breach of agreements on several fronts 
(Reuters, 2012). These political swings have frequently been motivated by 
populist policies in Argentina as well as in other Latin American countries.  
New forms of populism have emerged by targeting vulnerable sectors 
of the population mainly through alleviation programs which have been well 
received in a context of economic crisis and institutional weaknesses 
(Roberts, 1995). Populist policies have been geared toward the working 
classes with the main objective of gaining political preference. In the 
short/medium term, they generate an improvement in standards of living 
thereby justifying the re-allocation of resources. In the case of Argentina, this 
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‘redistribution’ has been accompanied by constant wage increases and large 
subsidies for several public services; a practice which leads to a significant 
fiscal deficit and, consequently, the inability to meet debt payments. The 
budget deficit is further aggravated by high inflation rates and capital flight. 
In the long run, the population experiences a severe drop in its standard of 
living manifested in higher prices, decreased purchasing power and dramatic 
shortages. Investors and MNCs have encountered in Argentina a third kind of 
risk trap: disguise and manipulation of information. Inflation figures 
announced publicly in recent years, through the National Institute of 
Statistics and Censuses (INDEC), have raised suspicions in the international 
arena because estimates of external agencies indicate inflation rates much 
higher than the ones published officially. According to information provided 
by Reuters (2011b), Argentina's economic consultants (for example, the 
consultancy firms Economía & Regiones and M&S Consultores) and market 
leaders, intimidated by government fines and the prospect of government 
retaliation, failed to accurately provide their inflation estimates which far 
exceeded the  official data.  
Kirchner's government (2003-2007) and then Fernández’ government 
(2007 to 2015) have been accused by economists, opponents and even 
employees of INDEC of manipulating data to underestimate inflation for 
political and economic gains.  Sufficient evidence suggests that the INDEC 
has been underestimating inflation and poverty leading to a lack of 
legitimacy of the official figures. Furthermore, disguise and manipulation of 
information has been exacerbated through the approval of some laws (such 
as the Audiovisual Communication Services Law) that may undermine 
freedom of expression (Macrory, 2013). 
The lack of transparent and accurate reporting is not uncommon in 
certain Latin American countries. The ultimate result is misinformation for 
weighing the risks and making appropriate business decisions. 
Mexico. 
 Today, Mexico is an example in the region for its monetary 
discipline, record reserves, world-class industry development of cement, 
telecommunications, steel, oil, petrochemicals, glass, foods and most notably 
high-tech specialization in automobile parts and aerospace. It is also a 
favorable place for investment given government streamlining of 
requirements for both domestic and foreign investors, its firm commitment 
(since 1986 on) to free trade and a hospitable environment for business. To a 
large degree, its success has been due to Mexico´s integration in the North 
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) with the United States and Canada. Its 
international trade and openness to FDI have been key drivers for economic 
growth, the development of manufacturing and well-diversified export base. 
Mexico’s economic stability and prosperity, despite ups and downs, is 
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less than two decades old.  The current situation is a diametric contrast to the 
1970s-1994.  During past years, Mexico was a country in almost perpetual 
crisis with devastating monetary and economic crashes invariably occurring 
between the close of the six-year presidential administrations and beginning 
of the next. Many MNCs operating in or with firms in Mexico were 
adversely affected by the economic and political turmoil.   
The case of Mexico provides a lesson concerning politically induced 
exogenous shocks.  First, the Banca Central (Mexican Federal Reserve Bank) 
pegged the peso to the USD which gave the illusion of stability but 
prevented the peso from responding to market forces and revaluing over 
time. It was held artificially high thus inviting speculation and capital flight. 
Second, a lack of separation of power (system of checks and balances) 
between the reserve bank and the executive power virtually gave presidents 
the indisputable authority to use reserves to maintain the pegs, finance 
programs, or pay debts.  They also had power to print money and incur new 
debt (bonds, and treasury notes) at exorbitant interest rates to cover public 
expenses. These two conditions alone were sufficient to drain the country’s 
reserves. However, another factor added in to further aggravate the situation: 
Mexico’s extreme reliance on commodity exports, particularly oil.    
Fortunately, today there is no longer any pegging-related risk; 
currency risk is the similar FOREX risk as in industrialized markets. 
Furthermore, the reserve bank is managed independently from the executive 
powers and has achieved relatively stable currency. Lastly, the country has 
made substantial progress in diversifying and upgrading its export base thus 
reducing its dependence on oil exports. 
Bolivia. 
 The presence of numerous and contentious indigenous groups in 
Bolivia, which fervently espouse the belief that natural resources must not be 
tapped if exploitation threatens the ecosystem, portray two types of risk 
frequently faced by MNCs. While their demands are justifiable, they have 
nevertheless culminated in intense protests leading to the death of several 
civilians. Such violence has induced President Evo Morales to nationalize 
companies and even entire sectors in an attempt to appease these groups. 
Such is the case of the Canadian mining South American Silver and of the tin 
and zinc mine Colquiri operated by the Swiss group Glencore. Morales has 
nationalized industries by presidential decree without previous warning or 
negotiations.  Industries affected include hydrocarbons, telecommunications 
and electricity industries. Bolivia faces several lawsuits before international 
tribunals for the nationalization of foreign firms.  
It worth noting the difference between the nationalization of the 
hydrocarbon and mining sectors. In the hydrocarbon sector, foreign firms 
were providers of state services while in the mining sector, firms were 
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partners with minority ownership and thus had stakes in the profits. One of 
the arguments that Morales has used to defend nationalization was the need 
to increase Bolivia’s international reserves which in turn would make the 
country more solvent and, therefore, eligible for new international 
development loans. In the case of Bolivia, much like Argentina, avoiding 
current account deficits, maintaining its currency value and protecting 
foreign reserves are key concerns behind nationalization. However, most 
analysts and international organizations (including the European 
Commission) consider that such measures send negative signals to 
international investors who consequently may not consider these markets for 
future ventures. 
Venezuela. 
 Perhaps, the main political risk faced by multinationals established in 
Venezuela is nationalization. Until 2008 when former President Hugo 
Chavez made the decision to nationalize the cement industry, the Mexican 
firm CEMEX, the French firm Lafarge and the Swiss firm Holcim were the 
major cement producers in Venezuela holding 50 percent, 25 percent and 25 
percent respectively of the market (AFP Agency, 2008). Both CEMEX and 
Holcim requested arbitration proceedings before the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Dispute (CIADI) to arrive at an acceptable 
settlement.  
The cement industry is only one example of the numerous 
nationalizations and expropriations that Chávez orchestrated during the last 
thirteen years he was in office. According to the information agency Reuters 
(2011c), the government has faced more than twenty cases of arbitration with 
various international bodies. The list of examples is vast and far-reaching; 
according to local newspapers, the incredible number of 499 expropriations 
occurred in the industrial sector in 2011 alone!  
The major detriment for MNCs is that in the last decade they have 
received compensation for only 10 percent of over a thousand assets claimed 
by the state. Among the companies that received compensation, the fair price 
agreed upon by the negotiating parties has not matched going market values 
(Reuters, 2011c). Unexpected nationalization has become a common risk in 
Latin America that discourages potential and current investors despite the 
attractiveness of some industries in terms of volume and profit. 
Honduras. 
 Over-stepping of authority has caused major problems to MNCs in 
some markets where democracy has been absent or where, as Pearce (2004) 
acknowledges, extra-constitutional manoeuvers have been used to retain, 
usurp or augment power. Such is the case of American firms Nike and Gap, 
as well as the German firm Adidas, which have seen some of the complicated 
consequences of the Honduran coup d’état in 2009. The companies 
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outsourced production through maquila operations in Tegucigalpa, 
Honduras. These operations represent significant savings for producers and a 
substantial source of income and employment in the region especially 
important after Honduras broke-off relations with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and consequently the international financial community 
(Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, 2010).  Honduras 
has become a major maquiladora centre and attracts firms from developed 
parts of the world.   
 An unexpected military coup d’état ousted President Zelaya from 
office and sent him into exile. Zelaya supporters believe he was attempting 
to increase minimum wages and improve worker conditions which enraged 
the country’s elite who financed the coup.  Conservatives who composed the 
opposition believed Zelaya was leaning too far to the left in Chavez fashion, 
trying to modify the constitution to serve his own re-election interests. What 
is certain, curfews, strikes, demonstrations prevented workers from getting to 
the factories.  Meanwhile importing raw materials and exporting finished 
goods became close to impossible creating major disruptions in production. 
Many major companies rescinded their contracts in the political upheaval 
with plans to move to more stable and even lower-cost countries.    
In the case of Nike, two of their local subcontractors closed their 
plants. According to Honduran law, these subcontractors were responsible 
for two million USD in severance pay for their workers. The arrangement 
was advantageous for Nike and other foreign subcontractors; they minimized 
risk and investment, took advantage of low costs, and let the locals worry 
about meeting legal requirements of their countries.  However, in today’s 
stage of globalization, such solutions can backfire.  
Legally, the subcontractors in Honduras were responsible for 
severance pay for workers. The only problem was: where would the money 
come from? The plants were insolvent and the government had no way of 
enforcing its worker protection laws.  Although Nike was not directly liable 
for severance pay, pressure from global consumer groups, athletes and shops 
that carry Nike goods from around the world held Nike morally responsible.  
In the end, Nike contributed more than 1.5 million dollars into a relief fund 
for workers, healthcare and ongoing support for vocational training and skill 
enhancement (Padgett, 2010). As unlikely as it may have seemed when Nike 
first entered Honduras, its chance of making a clean exit from the country is 
slim.  In sum, President Zelaya's attempt to go beyond his authority by 
amending the constitution, led to a coup that triggered a series of events that 
had long-term effects on business when, at the onset, the maquila scheme 
seemed to offer the least amount of commitment and close to 100 percent 
transfer of risk to the Honduran outsourcers. Overstepping of authority does 
not only erode democracy but also causes indirect consequences which can 
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be devastating for investors.   
Colombia. 
 The presence of organized crime in Latin American countries has 
become in the last decade one of the most obvious political risks in this 
region. Furthermore, political instability can facilitate the expansion of 
criminal activities (Salvatore, 2013). More than a decade ago, Colombia was 
the scene of clashes between leftist guerrilla groups and right-wing 
paramilitaries forcing the government to order military intervention. The city 
of Medellin was considered in the late 1980s and early 1990s the most 
violent of the country and hosted the powerful drug cartel led by Pablo 
Escobar (Reuters, 2013). Traffickers and guerrilla leaders vied with the 
government for political and economic power until the mid-1990s.  
However, the death of Pablo Escobar and former President Uribe’s 
introduction of a comprehensive security strategy, in the mid-2000s, 
overcame the resistance of the illegal armed groups. Hoping to stimulate 
private investment, particularly  in the hotel sector, the government launched 
a program in 2003 offering 30 years tax exemption for all construction or 
reform projects launched until 2018 (Universia Knowledge Wharton, 2012).  
 Despite Colombia´s gains in curbing drug-related violence, during 
2011 and 2012 there was renewed insecurity due to the resurgence of the 
guerrilla. The number of acts of sabotage against the national infrastructure 
in the first half of 2012 has been extraordinarily high and the most affected 
sector has been oil (ElEspectador.com, 2012). The Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) attacks on oil pipelines, causing spills to rivers, 
have reinstated their show of power and halted the exploration and 
production of MNCs such as the North American firm Occidental. However, 
the Colombian government and the FARC held peace talks shortly thereafter. 
The results have been clouded by the intervention of the National Liberation 
Army (ELN) (the second largest guerrilla group in Colombia) which has 
taken the opposite position and has resorted to kidnapping to show 
dissatisfaction with the government for not including it in negotiations with 
FARC (The Economist, 2013b). 
 Although Colombia's progress in the rehabilitation of its reputation is 
remarkable, the country's image continues to be mired by its grisly history of 
violence; one of its biggest impediments to growth. With respect to MNCs, it 
has been difficult to cleanse the image of Colombia because, in the past 
decades, firms in particular have been the target of theft, robbery, fraud, and 
violence.   
 From the literature review and the set of examples we have described, 
Tables 3a, 3b and 3c summarize the commonalities that the Latin American 
region exhibits in terms of political risks. As shown in Table 3a, these 
commonalities are grouped according to the institutional context from which 
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those risks emerge; in Table 3b, we show the common combination of risks 
factors leading to a particular political situation, and Table 3c displays the 
recurrence of those risks within the region at different time periods. 
Table 3a.   Political Risks’ Commonalities in Latin America: Institutional Context 
INSTITUTIONAL 
CONTEXT 
CORRESPONDING RISK TRAPS 
 
Central Bank 
Mismanagement. 
• Disguise and manipulation of information. 
• Politically induced exogenous shocks. 
• Over-stepping of authority. 
Reliance on commodity 
exports. 
• Expropriation/Confiscation/Nationalization 
• Irreverence of sovereign obligations. 
• Politically induced exogenous shocks. 
Numerous and contentious 
indigenous groups, 
accentuated levels of 
inequality. 
• Political turmoil 
• Expropriation/Confiscation/Nationalization 
Design of democracy • Over-stepping of authority. 
• Swings in international policy. 
Source: Authors´ own elaboration. 
 
In the following table, we identify specific risk combinations in 
different countries.  
Table 3b. Political Risks’ Commonalities in Latin America: Combination of Risk 
 
 Explicit manifestation  
     
 Implicit risk 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors´ own elaboration.     
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
       
         
         
         
         
         
         
 
TYPE OF POLITICAL RISK IDENTIFIED 
 
LATIN 
AMERIC
AN 
COUNTR
Y 
Expropriati
on/ 
Confiscation
/ 
Nationalisati
on 
Swings in 
internation
al policy 
Disguise 
and 
manipulati
on of 
informatio
n 
Politic
al 
turmo
il 
Over-
steppin
g of 
authori
ty 
Irreveren
ce for 
sovereign 
obligatio
ns 
Presenc
e of 
organiz
ed 
crime 
or 
terroris
t 
groups 
Politicall
y-
induced 
exogenou
s shocks 
Argentina X X X   X   
Mexico     X   X 
Bolivia X   X X    
Venezuela X  X  X    
Honduras    X X    
Colombia    X   X  
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Table 3c provides some examples of the appearance and reappearance 
of risks in Latin America. Evidently, the list is not exhaustive; it refers only 
to some specific political events. 
Table 3c. Political Risks’ Commonalities in Latin America: Recurrence of Risks 
RECURRENCE OF RISK FACTORS TIME FRAME 
 
• Expropriation/Confiscation/ 
Nationalization. 
 
• 2006: Bolivia. 
• 2008: Venezuela. 
• 2009: Bolivia. 
• 2012: Argentina. 
• Swings in international policy. • 1992: Privatisation of Yacimientos 
Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF): Nestor 
Kirchner 
• 2012: Nationalization of Repsol: 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner 
• Disguise and manipulation of key 
information (inflation figures) in 
Argentina. 
• 2003 – 2007: President Nestor Kirchner. 
• 2008 to date: President Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner. 
• Political turmoil. • 1964: Brazil. 
• 1968: Peru. 
• 1972: Bolivia. 
• 1973: Chile and Uruguay. 
• 1966/1976: Argentina. 
• 2002: Venezuela 
• 2009: Honduras. 
• Over-stepping of authority: coups d´état. • 1964: Brazil. 
• 1968: Peru. 
• 1972: Bolivia. 
• 1973: Chile and Uruguay. 
• 1966/1976: Argentina. 
• 2002: Venezuela 
• 2009: Honduras. 
• Irreverence for sovereign obligations in 
Argentina. 
 
• 1998 – 2002: systemic (financial) 
crises. 
• 2014 up to now: debt crisis. 
• Presence of organized crime or terrorist 
groups. 
• 1980s and 1990s: Colombia. 
• 2000s: Mexico. 
• Politically induced exogenous shocks in 
Mexico. 
• 1970s. 
• 1994-1995. 
Source: Authors´ own elaboration. 
 
 The cases described in the previous paragraphs provide the basis for 
the formulation of our aforementioned framework consisting of questions we 
believe management should ask, in order to complement their CPRA, 
regarding the eight risk categories identified in Table 1. The cases we 
included also provide a practical way for managers to conceptualize the 
issues raised in Table 2. If management is able to foresee potential political 
risks that may put their firms in dangerous situations, it will be better 
equipped to develop strategies to deal adroitly with these events. Lastly, we 
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contend that the aforementioned risks are prevalent in Latin America and 
these specific combinations of recurring risks set the region apart from others 
of the world. 
  In the second part of this case section, we analyze the reasons 
underlying the recurrence of the risk situations described. The constant 
economic crises that this region faces, in one country or another, provokes 
the enforcement of populist measures, despite any economic model officially 
endorsed.   
 Political risks in Latin America appear over and over again because 
social and institutional structures remain fairly static. The enduring, vested 
interests of entrenched power groups remain a factor explaining the lack of 
change and recurrence of political risk traps in Latin America. We have 
witnessed that government promoted changes that were actually insignificant 
and/or unsustainable. Those changes were not material in reducing poverty 
levels, increasing the quality of education, and in improving the distribution 
of wealth.  
 Legal order may change and improve, but the application of the legal 
system remains sketchy because the underlying informal institutions persist. 
Accordingly, the recurrence of risks is explained to a certain extent by the 
permanence of the aforementioned institutional arrangements; politicians’ 
personal interests continues to be the rule. The events in Latin American 
countries strongly suggest that their orientation towards the past is neither 
due to romanticism, nor to resentment, nor for psychological reasons; it is 
rather because it suits the interests of a select group of people.  
 Resurrecting past policies and reliving the same errors committed 
throughout time is emblematic in Latin America. 
 
Discussion 
 Our research questions in this article were: is there a combination of 
political risk factors common to Latin America? How can we account for the 
recurrence of the combination of such risk factors in the region? To answer 
these questions, we analyzed the institutional context in which those risks 
take place, determining the simultaneous presence of different types of 
political risks and the recurrence of such risks. The Latin American context 
gives rise to the application of economic models (neoliberal, populist or neo-
populist) bounded by political matters that, in most cases, fulfil individual 
interests at the expense of the common good. With respect to the first 
question in particular, we presented cases to illustrate combinations of 
political risks identified. 
 Previous literature has not analyzed those two aspects: risk 
combination and recurrence, in an integrative approach applied to this 
specific region. We believe that our approach is relevant because, despite the 
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geographical, geological, and even social diversity of Latin America, many 
of these countries share significant commonalities in terms of political risks.  
 Literature has considered the context surrounding the manifestation 
of such political risks by studying institutional voids (Khanna et al., 2005; 
Khanna & Palepu, 2013). Fewer authors dealt with Latin American settings. 
Authors who did so, remarked that the institutional design of democracy 
favored a strongly clientelistic style (a small number of patrons and a large 
number of potential clients) (Power, 2010). Tedesco and Diamint (2014) also 
recognized this extreme clientelism, presidentialism and populism as factors 
that have characterized the political leadership style in Latin America during 
the last decades. By the same token, Latin America is a good example of the 
dual political risk that Berlin (2004) labelled as instability risks and 
government risks. It is also an example of what Rarick (2000) defined as 
government and non-governmental forces because many of the political 
hazards faced by the region involve not just governmental instances but 
paramilitary groups, organized crime cells, and terrorist groups as well.  
 The aforementioned groups often display power that surfaces and 
subsides over time. As we have seen through the illustrated risk-traps, the 
eight types of political risks in the region occur in virtually all Latin 
American countries at one time or another, under one or another political 
regime. Furthermore, the situations faced by Latin American countries 
throughout time tend to be similar, one event experienced by a country is 
likely to be replicated in another at a given time.  In spite of the recurrence of 
such political risk traps, some managers continue to be stunned when this 
happens. Not surprisingly, foreign firms operating in Latin America have 
often incurred hefty losses. What is surprising is that they tended to fall into 
very similar risk traps time and time again. Some management teams have 
failed to anticipate these high-risk situations, underestimated them and/or 
misjudged their propensity to change when they were assessing foreign 
markets for feasibility and attractiveness.  Thus, they need to ask the right 
questions when analyzing the nature of risk in the region to take full 
advantage of both blossoming and ripe opportunities. Otherwise, firms will 
be ill-equipped to stand up to the challenges, react swiftly and carry on with 
strategies suited to business situations in Latin America.    
 
Conclusion: 
 In this article, we offer a complementary approach to CPRA by 
insisting on three facts that characterize Latin American countries: 
1. The weak institutional context leads to the implementation of 
neoliberal, populist or neo-populist economic models restrained by political 
matters which continually privilege personal over common interests. 
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2. Political risks imply a combination of several factors. Due to the 
aforementioned institutional voids, a kind of risk does not occur isolated; it 
brings with itself other kinds of risks simultaneously. Consequently, a 
'domino' effect is depicted which affects several systems at the same time 
(labor market, social system, level of openness, product markets, financial 
system….). 
3. The recurrence of political risks is not just attached to cultural issues; 
it is also closely linked to the central facts surrounding our discussion: 
institutional weaknesses and satisfaction of individual interests at the 
expense of the collective ones, and very importantly, the understanding of 
the occurrence and recurrence of such risks cannot be disassociated from the 
countries’ historical evolution. 
 In order to identify and assess the most common risk-traps, we 
referred to specific country situations. Likewise, we assessed these risk-traps 
from a multi-factor approach. Avoiding such risk traps will aid managerial 
teams in identifying and anticipating diverse risk situations, developing 
contingency plans, and more adeptly managing their investments. 
 Acknowledgement of potential risk at the opportune moment is the 
first step in responding promptly by formulating the appropriate strategies. 
Despite the constant change and regional complexities, MNCs simply cannot 
afford to miss the opportunity to gain a strong foothold and assert their 
presence in Latin America; the region is far too large and profitable to omit 
from any portfolio of international activities.  
 Our analysis focused on the identification and assessment of potential 
political risks in Latin America. A ripe area for future research might cover 
mitigation and monitoring of these risks traps in the region. It would be 
enriching also to document any potentially significant changes and structural 
reforms that are now taking place in Latin American countries, and which 
will bring with them new risks and challenges for companies operating in 
this region. Likewise, it would be interesting and informative to make this 
analysis on a subnational basis to reveal contrasts that may occur between 
states or provinces with different levels of institutionalization. In the same 
vein, a comparison of Latin American countries with other emerging markets 
would be timely and necessary following the three dimensions that we 
identified in our study: namely, the nature of political risks involved, their 
specific combination and their recurrence. 
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